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Abstract: Low retirement savings rates, coupled with a lack of preservation of retirement funds when 
individuals move jobs, could have adverse repercussions on a person’s ability to retire with sufficient 
funds. The traditional response to low preservation levels has been to impose taxes on cash withdrawals 
and in some cases to mandate preservation. However, without a complete understanding of the factors 
that drive low levels of preservation, these policy interventions might do more harm than good. This 
study carries out a critical, interdisciplinary literature review to construct a conceptual model of the 
factors which potentially lead to low preservation levels and outlines proposed interventions. The 
resultant model highlights the distinct differences in the drivers of rational and irrational behaviour and 
therefore, the distinctly different interventions required. Little is known about the rationality or 
otherwise of the decision making process of individuals in the retirement preservation context, however 
current interventions only assist if individuals display bounded willpower. It is essential that a better 
understanding of the decision making process is obtained to determine whether existing solutions 
address the problem adequately. 
 
Keywords: Pre-retirement cash outs; life-cycle hypothesis; behavioural life-cycle hypothesis; bounded 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is widespread concern that individuals are not saving sufficiently for retirement. Some of the 
reasons could include delaying the decision to save, not saving enough, or not preserving saved funds 
when moving jobs. The focus of many studies and reform programs has been on the first two issues 
(Gough & Niza, 2011). However, pre-retirement cash-outs are increasingly recognised as a key issue that 
may result in insufficient savings at retirement (South Africa, National Treasury, 2011; United States, 
Working Group on Retirement Plan Leakage, 1998). Australia, Germany, Switzerland, Canada and the 
United Kingdom already strictly regulate pension withdrawals prior to retirement. In other jurisdictions, 
such as the United States and South Africa, pension withdrawals prior to retirement are discouraged 
through the use of taxes and penalties (South Africa, National Treasury, 2012). Despite these 
disincentives, many individuals still access funds when changing jobs. Studies in the United States have 
found that more than half of employees do not preserve retirement savings when they move jobs 
(Bassett, Fleming & Rodrigues, 1998; Engelhardt, 2002; Munnell, Golub-Sass & Muldoon, 2009). Research 
in South Africa has also found that the majority of individuals take a cash payout when switching 
employers (Old Mutual, 2010; Sanlam Employee Benefits, 2013; South Africa, National Treasury, 2007).  
 
In light of the growing concerns about low savings levels and the lack of preservation of retirement 
savings, governments in both the United States and South Africa, are considering ways to decrease 
withdrawals through further policy intervention (John & Iwry, 2008; South Africa, National Treasury, 
2012). Given the low level of preservation in South Africa, the National Treasury has stated that: “The 
challenge with the current tax system is that the tax clearly does not serve as a strong disincentive since 
people are willing to pay it and withdraw their savings” (South Africa, National Treasury, 2011, p. 52). 
Therefore the South African government’s current focus is on implementing mandatory preservation 
(South Africa, National Treasury, 2013). However, without a complete understanding of the factors that 
drive low levels of preservation, the introduction of various interventions might potentially do more 
harm than good. The purpose of this study is to build a conceptual model of the factors which potentially 
play a role in retirement preservation decisions. The model will also detail which interventions are 
suitable to address the various causes of low levels of preservation. The rationale for the creation of this 
model is that it will highlight which interventions are suitable in each instance. This will provide initial 
indications of the potential impact of current policy interventions. In addition it will create a 
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comprehensive platform to facilitate future empirical testing of factors that actually drive low 
preservation levels. The paper begins with an overview of the theoretical foundation for the study which 
focuses on the traditional and behavioural approaches to savings theory. Next, the research approach 
adopted in this study is outlined. Thereafter the foundation for the construction of the conceptual model 
is set out focussing on potential reasons for early withdrawals. Potential interventions to assist with 
optimal decision making in preservation decisions are then outlined. The paper concludes with the 
construction of a conceptual model of retirement preservation decision making and a discussion of the 
implications emerging from this model.  
 
2. Theoretical Foundation 
 
In order to determine what factors potentially impact on retirement preservation decisions, the 
theoretical basis for various savings theories must first be investigated. The distinction between the 
traditional and behavioural approaches to savings and the relative importance of psychological factors in 
savings decision-making needs to be explored. When investigating the historical development of savings 
theories a number of authors highlight a common theme. This theme is the rise and fall, and rise again, of 
the importance of psychological factors in explaining savings behaviour (Frederick, Loewenstein & 
O’Donoghue, 2002; Warneryd, 1999). In many cases the original contributors to theory development 
were acutely aware of the role that psychology played in the decision making process of individuals as it 
related to savings (Thaler, 1997). However the pressure to convert economics into a mathematical 
science resulted in the removal of psychological considerations from savings theories. This in turn led to 
the development of theories, such as the life-cycle hypothesis (LCH) (Modigliani & Brumberg, 2005). 
These theories are normative in nature, and describe how rational individuals should behave, rather than 
describing how they might actually behave. The LCH is based on the idea that the consumer is able to 
solve complex computations to determine the optimum saving and consumption levels over their lifetime 
(Graham & Isaac, 2002). This would imply that individuals are able to determine how much of their 
income they need to save for retirement, implement the appropriate saving plan and not deviate from the 
plan (Monahan, 2004). If individuals act according to traditional models, there would be no requirement 
for taxes, penalties, regulation or any intervention to influence behaviour. They would make rational 
decisions that result in optimal consumption and saving levels.   
 
However, in the latter part of the 20th century, a renewed focus on the influence of psychological 
considerations in economic decision making led to the development of descriptive theories of savings 
behaviour. One such theory is the behavioural life-cycle hypothesis (BLCH) (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) 
which explicitly considers the impact of behavioural and psychological factors on savings behaviour. 
According to the BLCH the decisions made by individuals may not result in optimal savings levels. This 
appears to imply that there is a need for some form of intervention in the savings decisions of individuals 
to ensure that sufficient funds are available for retirement. The different approaches adopted by the LCH 
versus the BLCH are not merely theoretical debates. They have important implications for whether policy 
makers should intervene in individual decision making regarding savings. Adding to the importance of 
establishing the validity of the above hypotheses is the renewed focus on the individual as decision 
maker. This has occurred as the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution retirement plans puts 
the responsibility for retiring with adequate funds in the hands of the individual (Monahan, 2004). 
Considering the many decisions that individuals have to make regarding saving for retirement, a number 
of authors have highlighted those behavioural factors have the potential to result in sub-optimal 
retirement savings decisions. These factors are broadly classified as stemming from either bounded 
rationality or bounded willpower (Desai, 2011; Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, 1998; Monahan, 2004; Thaler, 
1994). Bounded rationality generally refers to computational limitations facing the decision maker. This 
is defined as “rational choice that takes into account the cognitive limitations of the decision-maker. 
These limitations can be  both knowledge and computational capacity” (Simon, 1987). Therefore 
individuals may make sub-optimal choices as a result of the computational complexity of retirement 
savings decisions.   
 
Bounded willpower, on the other hand, results in individuals knowingly taking actions that are not in 
their best interests in the long term (Jolls et al., 1998).This is linked to self-control and procrastination 
(Diamond & Vartiainen, 2007). It manifests itself in individuals exhibiting a lack of self-control by 
consuming rather than saving and procrastinating by putting off the decision to start saving. Self-control 
problems are generally associated with individuals who display situational inconsistencies. They plan to 
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act in a specific way, but change their minds when presented with a situation where they are tempted to 
act impulsively. Procrastination on the other hand appears to result from intertemporal inconsistencies. 
This is as a result of the fact that an individual places much greater value on current consumption 
compared to future consumption needs. The latter is also referred to as hyperbolic discounting 
(Monahan, 2004). In the context of preservation decisions the same biases that influence general 
retirement savings decisions have the potential to impact on preservation decision making. Therefore, the 
risk exists that individuals fail to preserve funds when it is optimal to do so. This being as a result of 
bounded willpower related to self-control problems or bounded rationality arising from computational 
complexity. However, rational reasons, linked to the LCH and consumption smoothing behaviour may 
also explain preservation decisions. The research approach to explore these concepts more fully, in the 
context of a conceptual model, is set out in the next section.    
 
3. Research Approach 
 
The approach adopted in this study is explained in terms of the problem solving model developed by 
Mitroff, Betz, Pondy and Sagasti (1974). The particular focus of this study is on the part of the model 
which moves from a problem situation, through a process of conceptualisation, to the development of a 
conceptual model. The study commences with the identification of the research problem. This problem is 
the lack of understanding of all potential factors driving low levels of preservation of retirement funds, 
when employees move jobs. A critical, interdisciplinary literature review is carried out to determine the 
factors which potentially lead to low preservation levels and what interventions, if any, are appropriate to 
address these low levels of preservation. These factors and interventions are then combined to create a 
conceptual model of the retirement preservation decision making environment. The following two 
sections, 4 and 5, focus on the conceptualisation and model building process. Section 6 outlines the final 
conceptual model.   
 
4. Conceptual model building: potential reasons for early withdrawals 
 
As outlined in section 2, when leaving a job, the reasons for choosing to take a cash payout rather than 
preserving retirement funds can be either rational or irrational. Rational reasons would focus on the 
predictions of the LCH linked to consumption smoothing. Irrational reasons would be related to bound 
rationality and bounded willpower. Specific individual characteristics or circumstances would need to be 
associated with behaviour which is considered rational or irrational. Each aspect is considered in more 
detail below. 
 
Rational decision makers: Rational reasons for taking cash payment would relate to individuals who are 
exhibiting consumption smoothing behaviour as predicted by the LCH. Therefore young adults who are in 
the consumption phase of their life cycle would be expected to make use of funds which they have access 
to when they move jobs to pay for immediate consumption needs, or to start paying back debt incurred in 
the consumption phase. These individuals would ultimately be maximising their utility by choosing to use 
funds for immediate consumption, or the payment of existing debts. Such behaviour would be observed 
among young adults, with a move to higher levels of preservation among older adults (Love, 2007). 
Liquidity constraints would also result in rational decision makers choosing to take a cash payment 
rather than preserving when leaving an employer. This reflects consumption smoothing behaviour 
(Amromin & Smith, 2003). In this respect, a factor which would play a role in determining rationality 
would be related to the reason for leaving a job. In general, if the person has been fired or retrenched, 
then funds might provide consumption smoothing over the unemployed time period. Alternatively, 
individuals might be in a position where they require the funds to meet immediate survival needs. This is 
another potentially rational reason for accessing funds.  
 
Irrational decision makers 
 
Individuals displaying bounded rationality: The decision as to whether it is optimal to preserve 
retirement funds is by its very nature complex. It has the potential to be an area where individuals who 
display bounded rationality would be predisposed to make sub-optimal choices. The computational 
complexity of the preservation decision requires, in the first instance, that an individual has the ability to 
understand and apply the impact of compounding over a future time period. This appears to be beyond 
the ability of many individuals (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007). In addition, numerous uncertain factors that 
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need to be taken into account include future investment returns, inflation rates, length of working life and 
retirement. These add to the complexity of the decision making process.  One conceptual model of 
retirement savings decisions highlights thirty seven different elements that needed to be considered 
(Hershey, Walsh, Brougham, Carter & Farrell, 1998). Given the complexity of the retirement decision 
making environment, it has been suggested that those with better education and financial knowledge 
might be better equipped to make retirement savings decisions (Bernheim, 2002; John & Iwry, 2008; 
Thaler, 1994). Studies have also found positive relationships between financial knowledge and savings 
(Bernheim, Garrett & Maki, 2001; Peng, Bartholomae, Fox, & Cravener, 2007) and particularly retirement 
savings decisions (Klapper & Panos, 2011; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011). Therefore, it is expected that the 
potential factors which might indicate that an individual displays bounded rationality would be linked to 
lower education levels and low levels of financial literacy.   
 
Individuals displaying bounded willpower 
 
Overview of the influence of impulse control and time perspective: Behavioural biases associated 
with bounded willpower are thought to result from a lack of self-control and procrastination. The latter 
result from situational and temporal inconsistencies in decision making (Monahan, 2004). These 
inconsistencies are associated with two specific individual characteristics, namely impulsivity and time 
perspective (Ferrari & Díaz-Morales, 2007; Loewenstein, 1996; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Time 
perspective is defined as representing “an individual’s way of relating to the psychological concepts of 
past, present, and future” (Boniwell & Zimbardo, 2004, p. 166). Impulsivity usually refers to actions that 
are taken without thinking of future consequences. This is linked to poor self-control, inability to delay 
gratification and temporal inconsistencies (Evenden, 1999). In general, the ability to exert impulse 
control and a time perspective that focuses on the future are generally believed to lead to increased self-
control (Loewenstein, 1996) and less procrastination (Ferrari & Díaz-Morales, 2007). A person with a 
high level of future orientation focuses on future goals and is able to delay gratification and resist 
temptation (Boniwell & Zimbardo, 2004). Therefore, time perspectives are thought to have a strong 
influence on financial planning and savings behaviour (Hershey & Mowen, 2000; Jacobs-Lawson & 
Hershey, 2005). The level of impulsivity of an individual also plays a role in savings behaviour (Monahan, 
2004).  
 
In an attempt to obtain a clearer understanding of the neurological processes that drive future orientation 
and impulse control, neuroimaging has provided unique insights. A study carried out by McClure, Laibson, 
Lowenstein & Cohen (2004) finds two distinct areas of the brain associated with future orientation and 
impulsivity in the context of intertemporal choice. The lateral prefrontal cortex is associated with the 
reasoning process linked to future orientation and the decision to defer gratification. The limbic and 
paralimbic systems are associated with behaviour that is impulsive and based on immediate gratification. 
The interaction between the two regions is reflective of the two self model proposed by Thaler and 
Shefrin (1981) where the “farsighted planner” competes with the “myopic doer”.  Differences in levels of 
self-control and impulsivity have been linked to both developmental aspects related to age, as well as 
persistent individual differences.  
 
Age related differences in willpower: Generally, willpower develops as part of the maturation process 
of the brain.  Links have been found between brain maturation and future orientation (Romer, 
Duckworth, Sznitman, & Park, 2010) and the ability to exercise impulse control (Steinberg et al., 2008). A 
study of neural images across age in a temporal discounting task showed support for the view that 
humans develop progressive self-control as they mature from adolescence to adulthood. This is as a result 
of the strengthening of connections between brain areas related to foresight and self-control (Christakou, 
Brammer, & Rubia, 2011). Giedd (2004) highlights that one of the last brain regions to mature is the 
dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex. This area is associated with controlling impulses and reaches adult 
dimensions in the early twenties. In the context of preservation decisions an important distinction needs 
to be made between the actions of young individuals who do not preserve their funds because of bounded 
willpower (related to underdeveloped impulse control) and the actions of young individuals who take a 
cash pay-out to rationally smooth consumption. Therefore age as an isolated factor would provide no 
clear insight as to whether rational or behavioural factors drive low levels of preservation.  
 
Individual differences in willpower: The brain maturation process explains differences between 
children, adolescents and adults. There are still individual differences that exist in terms of impulse 
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control and time perspective which are unique to each individual (Peters & Büchel, 2011; Romer et al., 
2010). Time perspective is influenced by a number of factors.  These are culture, religion, upbringing, 
education and specific societal influences (Boniwell & Zimbardo, 2004). It is also recognised that an 
individual’s time perspective is a relatively stable trait, particularly if an individual is influenced 
predominantly by one specific time frame (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Impulse control is also considered to 
be a fairly stable personality trait. This is demonstrated in a 40 year longitudinal study. This study finds 
that the ability to delay gratification in childhood is a predictor for how well people are able to resist 
temptation in favour of long term goals throughout adolescence and adulthood (Casey et al., 2011).  
Therefore there are key individual differences in these particular personality traits which persist over 
time. This would imply that one would expect to see that impulsive individuals, or those with a low level 
of future orientation, would be less likely to preserve retirement funds if bounded willpower is the key 
driver of low preservation levels.  
 
Summarised impact of factors: Table 1 contains a summary of the factors that could potentially explain 
low preservation levels. These factors are specifically related to the assumed level of rationality of the 
decision maker as well as the underlying cause of irrationality.  
 
Table 1: Potential factors which could drive low preservation levels 
Decision 
maker 
Potential causes Potential Factors What would predict low 
levels of preservation 
Rational Consumption smoothing Age;  
Liquidity constraints 
Young 
Low levels of liquidity 
Irrational Bounded rationality  Education; Financial 
literacy 
Low levels of education / 
financial literacy  
Bounded willpower Time perspective Low level of future orientation 
Level of impulsivity High levels of impulsivity 
 
It appears that if we observe low levels of preservation among young individuals, or individuals who are 
facing liquidity constraints then these individuals are acting rationally. This is provided that these 
individuals are not also demonstrating characteristics of bounded willpower associated with age related 
differences in willpower. From the perspective of bounded rationality, it is anticipated that low levels of 
education and financial literacy would result in low preservation levels. When considering bounded 
willpower, individuals with high levels of impulsivity and low levels of future orientation would also be 
expected to cash out retirement savings. While the distinction between those displaying bounded 
rationality and bounded willpower is not clear cut, and by no means mutually exclusive, it provides a 
useful categorisation for considering the impact of various interventions. The following section continues 
the process of developing the conceptual model by focusing on the potential interventions that are 
suitable to address the various causes of low levels of preservation.  
 
5. Conceptual model building: potential interventions 
 
Overview: Desai (2011) provides an outline of the general solutions available to policy makers in an 
attempt to solve cognitive biases in individual decision making. These interventions range from pure 
libertarianism to libertarian paternalism to paternalism. Each approach has specific implications for the 
interventions which are available to the policy maker. The following sections set out these options in 
more detail and highlight the specific interventions available in each approach. The resultant impact for 
both rational and irrational decision makers is also discussed. 
 
Libertarianism: Freedom of choice is a key tenet of a libertarian approach (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). 
The approach of pure libertarianism is appealing to those who believe that individuals act rationally. In 
this instance, policy makers choose to do nothing suggesting that individuals know what is best for them, 
and intervention is not required. This approach requires that individuals are left to make their own 
decisions without any interference and assumes that individuals are able to determine optimal choices. 
 
Impact on rational decision makers: Without any form of intervention a rational decision maker would 
be able to make the choice to preserve or not preserve retirement funds. The choice made would result in 
the maximisation of their utility over their lifespan as predicted by the LCH.  
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Impact on irrational decision makers: Irrational decision makers, both those displaying bounded 
rationality and bounded willpower, would be disadvantaged by an approach that leaves them to make 
their own decisions. From the perspective of an individual displaying bounded rationality, they will be 
unable to work out the optimal choice. Those suffering from a lack of self-control will probably take the 
cash payment as will those who are procrastinators as they will believe that they can start saving towards 
retirement again at a later date (Monahan, 2004).  
 
Paternalism: regulatory intervention: A purely paternalistic policy uses policy tools such as regulatory 
intervention to dictate how individuals must behave on the assumption that individuals are acting 
irrationally. As discussed in section 1, the traditional response to promote retirement savings and 
preservation of retirement funds has taken the form of regulatory intervention. In this respect, the most 
common measures implemented include tax incentives to save, and taxes and penalties to dissuade 
withdrawals. A more stringent approach to stop withdrawals from pension funds prior to retirement is to 
mandate preservation of funds through regulation.  
 
Impact on rational decision makers: The use of penalties and restrictions on withdrawal may have a 
negative impact on those who act rationally as part of consumption smoothing behaviour over their life 
span. One study which makes use of a stochastic life cycle model to determine the potential impact of 
various retirement plan features found the following. The model predicts that a system which allows for 
un-penalised withdrawals would increase the participation of younger college graduates by up to 30%. 
This would allow access to rational savers who participate in consumption smoothing behaviour as 
predicted by the LCH (Love, 2007).  This simulation model draws attention to the fact that any penalties 
imposed on withdrawals have a potentially negative impact on rational individuals participating in 
consumption smoothing behaviour. If it is only optimal to begin saving later in life, then job moves give 
rational individuals the opportunity to cash out retirement savings which they do not yet require.  
 
In addition, the most vulnerable in society are those who suffer the most from penalties imposed on 
withdrawals which have to be made to meet pressing liquidity constraints. One study of the impact of the 
introduction of a penalty on early withdrawals in the United States found that among high income groups 
an increase in the tax raised the probability of preservation of benefits far more than it did among low 
income groups (Chang, 1996). The study found that those in the low income bracket were probably 
liquidity constrained and as such were willing to incur the penalty to access their funds. According to the 
authors, the insignificant impact of the penalty on those in low income brackets meant that penalties 
would be an ineffective policy tool for curbing the withdrawal of funds among low income earners. 
Investigations in the United States aimed at understanding how to reduce leakage from pension plans 
have reached similar conclusions in terms of the use of penalties. In general they have cautioned against 
the use of penalties, and the idea that increased penalties provide solutions to leakage. The key reason for 
this is the impact that such penalties have on the most vulnerable, who, due to pressing liquidity needs, 
will access cash irrespective of the level of penalty imposed (John & Iwry, 2008). Overall, taxes, penalties 
and mandatory preservation produce sub-optimal results for rational decision makers.  The latter may 
require access to their savings to facilitate consumption smoothing or to meet urgent liquidity needs.  
 
Impact on irrational decision makers: From the perspective of individuals displaying bounded 
willpower, it has been suggested that limitation and penalties on withdrawals provide individuals with a 
way to exercise self-control and therefore act as a pre-commitment device (Venti & Wise, 1990). As one 
author explains “Anticipating a possible future loss of self-control, an individual may actually be more 
likely to contribute to a tax-favored account that provides a credible mechanism for precommitment” 
(Bernheim, 2002, p. 1205). The use of rules, both external and internal, as a means to overcome self-
control issues is a key component of the behavioural approach to savings (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988). In this 
regard, Thaler (1990, p. 200) discusses the impact of considering retirement funds as “off limits” as the 
taxes and penalties associated with accessing these funds prior to retirement provide a useful self-control 
mechanism. From the perspective of individuals who display bounded rationality, taxes and penalties do 
not necessarily assist them, unless the optimal choice is to save funds. This arises from the fact that taxes 
and penalties could be perceived to be an external cue regarding the optimal choice (Akerlof & Shiller, 
2009), leading the individual to preserve funds. However, if the individual is better off using the funds for 
other purposes (e.g. to pay off debt), a decision to preserve funds would be sub-optimal. 
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Conclusion regarding paternalistic interventions 
 
While paternalistic interventions can dissuade irrational behaviour, they end up punishing those who 
may be acting rationally.  They can even discourage saving in the first place. The above discussion would 
seem to suggest that the best interests of all participants are not optimally met by Paternalistic 
Interventions. . While the system might assist irrational individuals in exercising self-control, those acting 
rationally run the risk of being penalised. 
 
Libertarian paternalism: behavioural intervention: The shortcomings and potential for unintended 
consequences of a system that relies on regulatory incentives and disincentives has led to a move to find 
an approach that assists those acting irrationally, without imposing constraints and restrictions on those 
who act rationally. As one author explains it, “In short, we must search for essentially noncoercive ways of 
guiding individuals' retirement decisions, nudging them over any cognitive hurdles without succumbing 
to the temptation of overbearing paternalism” (Zelinsky, 2004, p. 524). In a similar vein, O’Donaghue & 
Rabin (1999) call for the adoption of policies that do little harm to those acting rationally, while at the 
same time help those acting in an irrational manner. Libertarian paternalism appears to meet this 
mandate. It combines a paternalistic element by directing individuals to a specific choice, with a 
libertarian aspect in which it is relatively easy to opt out of the suggested choice (Sunstein & Thaler, 
2003). This can be achieved through the use of behavioural tools. These tools include choice architecture, 
which influences individuals to act in a specific way, or education and debiasing to overcome specific 
biases. These interventions are discussed in more detail in the following sections.  
 
Choice architecture: One of the key methods of integrating behavioural insights into retirement savings 
decisions is through the use of choice architecture.  This makes use of specific presentation and framing 
to direct individuals to an optimal choice (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). This approach makes use of 
“nudges”. These are described as “any aspect of choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To 
count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid.” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 6) 
The use of defaults is one of the key tools of a choice architect. Provided that there is an option to opt out 
of the default choice, and that due consideration has been given to what the optimal default should be, it 
meets the criteria for libertarian paternalism. Defaults are very powerful. Many individuals end up in the 
default condition as a result of inertia and procrastination or because they see the default as a 
recommended choice (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). The use of choice architecture in the form of defaults is 
widely used to increase enrolment in pension plans (Munnell et al., 2009). Defaults assist individuals to 
overcome the tendency to procrastinate and delay decision making. In addition, in many instances, 
defaults are seen as a recommendation from an authority figure or as the “correct” choice to make (Choi, 
Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick, 2004; Madrian & Shea, 2001; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). They therefore 
influence individuals displaying bounded rationality who are looking for some indication of what the 
“correct” choice is. Given the ability of defaults to dictate behaviour, their use in preservation decisions 
has received increasing attention (Choi et al., 2004; Poterba, Venti, & Wise, 1998). Following 
investigations regarding the level of plan leakages, and recommendations from various committees (see 
for example United States, Working Group on Retirement Plan Leakage, 1998), the United States 
government has recognised the positive impact that default choices can potentially have on savings 
behaviour. Policies have been implemented that take account of this (Choi et al., 2004).  
 
Impact on rational decision makers: The key benefit of using defaults rather than taxes and regulations 
to influence decision making, is that individuals have the ability to opt out of a default. Therefore if 
individuals are acting rationally when they choose to withdraw funds from their pension, they can opt-
out of a default choice without incurring penalties.  
 
Impact on irrational decision makers: If individuals are acting irrationally when taking a cash 
withdrawal, the default option to preserve might lead to higher preservation levels.  Issues such as inertia 
and procrastination, or the fact that the default option carries an endorsement, can influence behaviour. 
However, critics raise the issue that while defaults are useful in solving the cognitive biases of 
procrastinators and those who are subject to status quo bias, they fail to address the issues of bounded 
rationality or self-control problems (Desai, 2011). Therefore an individual who has self-control problems 
will merely opt out of the default of preservation. In addition, if individuals, due to bounded rationality, 
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are not able to work out whether they should preserve or not, the default of preservation might result in a 
sub-optimal decision. 
 
Debiasing: Choice architecture has some drawbacks. Another approach suggested a way to overcome 
various biases associated with irrational decision making is to make use of a debiasing process (Fischhoff, 
1982). Debiasing is defined as “a procedure for reducing or eliminating biases from the cognitive 
strategies of the decision maker” (Bazerman, 1990, p. 170). The practical implementation of debiasing 
strategies generally focuses on two different approaches.  These are cognitive interventions, based on 
education and training, or technological interventions. The latter include the use of intelligent software 
and decision aids (Evans, 1989; Larrick, 2004).  
 
Impact on rational decision makers: The use of educational and technological interventions to assist 
decision making will have a neutral impact on rational decision makers. However, if decision makers are 
rational then the costs of these interventions would be wasted. Depending on who bears the costs, 
rational individuals could end up being negatively impacted by these interventions.  
 
Impact on irrational decision makers: Whether debiasing can be successful is open to debate. Some 
believe that cognitive limitations will stand in the way of any educational or training efforts to overcome 
bias (Larrick, 2004; Stanovich, 1999). Others are of the opinion that technological interventions don’t 
promote the learning required to overcome bias.  This leads to weakened decision making (Glover, 
Prawitt, & Spilker, 1997). In addition, there are a number of other obstacles that can prevent debiasing. 
These could result from the nature of the individual decision maker (Fischhoff, 1982; Larrick, 2004), the 
psychological processes that produce the bias (Epley & Gilovich, 2005) or the specific decision making 
environment (Willis, 2008).  
 
That being said, there are studies that have found that educational debiasing can be effective (Larrick, 
Morgan, & Nisbett, 1993; Mann, Beswick, Allouache, & Ivey, 1989; Nisbett, Fong, Lehman, & Cheng, 1987) 
and that technological interventions can also assist in debiasing (Bhandari, Hassanein, & Deaves, 2008; 
Lim, Benbasat, & Ward, 2000; Looney & Hardin, 2009). While the research in this area is limited, 
preliminary debiasing studies, using decision support systems in the investment and retirement decision 
making fields, have produced positive results (Bhandari et al., 2008; Looney & Hardin, 2009). It would 
therefore appear that the complexity of preservation decisions, along with biases resulting from lack of 
self-control and procrastination, might be susceptible to debiasing interventions. Decision support 
systems and decision aids can assist with computations that assist individuals who suffer from bounded 
rationality. From the perspective of overcoming bounded willpower, various studies have shown that 
there are methods to debias both impulsivity (Odum, 2011; Peters & Büchel, 2011) and a lack of future 
orientation (Hall & Fong, 2003; Hershfield et al., 2011). Whether the techniques can successfully be 
implemented in a retirement preservation decision making context has not been established.  
 
Conclusions regarding behavioural intervention: Interventions that use the insights from behavioural 
economics to provide solutions to the problem of low preservation levels have the potential to assist 
individuals in specific circumstances. Choice architecture and the use of defaults will generally only assist 
those individuals suffering from procrastination. At the same time rational individuals are able to opt out 
of such defaults ensuring they are not negatively impacted. As mentioned above, individuals suffering 
from bounded rationality and self-control problems are potentially not assisted by choice architecture. 
Debiasing has the potential to provide assistance to individuals displaying both bounded rationality and 
bounded willpower. However, depending on the costs incurred in setting up a debiasing process, rational 
individuals may end up bearing costs they do not need to incur.  
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Table 2: Potential impact (positive  or negative) of interventions on various types of decision 
makers 
Approach Intervention Impact on 
Rational 
decision 
maker 
Impact on Irrational decision maker 
Bounded 
rationality 
Bounded willpower 
Self-control Procrastination 
L
ib
er
ta
ri
an
is
m
 
None     
P
at
er
n
al
is
m
 
 
Taxes and 
mandatory 
preservation 
    
L
ib
er
ta
ri
an
 
p
at
er
n
al
is
m
 
Choice 
architecture 
    
Debiasing a    
adepending on who bears costs of debiasing intervention could have a negative impact 
 
Summary of the impact of proposed interventions on various decision makers: Table 2 summarises 
the potential impact of various types of intervention. A libertarian approach is only successful if decision 
makers are rational. The interventions proposed by paternalism in the form of taxes, penalties and 
regulation may assist irrational decision makers. Those proposed by libertarian paternalism in the form 
of choice architecture and debiasing may assist irrational decision makers, but may not be appropriate for 
all decision makers. In general paternalism is most effective in assisting irrational individuals who display 
self-control and procrastination problems. The penalties and regulations which encourage preservation 
are most likely to change the behaviour of these individuals. Libertarian paternalism, through choice 
architecture in the form of defaults, is most useful in directing the actions of irrational individuals who 
display procrastination. Debiasing has the potential to positively impact on both individuals suffering 
from bounded rationality, and those who display bounded willpower. However, the ideas in the debiasing 
framework are currently untested in a preservation context. A number of critics have pointed out that any 
interventions in individual decision making must help those who require assistance, without penalising 
those who do not need assistance (Camerer, Issacharoff, O’Donoghue, Rabin, & Loewenstein, 2003; Desai, 
2011; Klick & Mitchell, 2006; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). As the above discussion illustrates, 
interventions are only successful in specific instances. A one size fits all approach has the potential to do 
more harm than good. Deciding which of the above strategies is optimal requires an understanding of the 
inherent level of rationality of decision makers in a retirement preservation context.  
 
6. Conceptual Model: The insights provided by existing literature into the possible causes and 
contributing factors which may lead to inadequate savings as a result of sub-optimal retirement 
preservation decisions and the overview of the various interventions available to address this problem 
are summarised in the conceptual model displayed in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Conceptual model of retirement preservation decision making 
 
A rational model of preservation decision making would predict that those who are young or liquidity 
constrained would be least likely to preserve funds. This would arise as a result consumption smoothing 
as predicted by the LCH or would be driven by necessity where an individual requires access to funds to 
survive on a day to day basis. If rational factors drive low levels of preservation no intervention is 
required. These individuals make optimal retirement preservation decisions. Individuals should be 
allowed access to funds to allow them to facilitate consumption smoothing behaviour, or meet liquidity 
requirements.  A model of bounded rationality would predict that those who have low levels of education 
or financial literacy would display low preservation levels as they are not be able to cope with the 
computational complexity. The intervention required to assist decision making in this instance would 
focus on debiasing, either through education and training, or technological decision support. From the 
perspective of bounded willpower, low levels of preservation would be expected for those who have an 
immediate time orientation and a high level of impulsivity. These two factors would collectively point to 
low levels of self-control and a tendency to procrastinate. Interventions required to assist decision 
makers would be directed at behavioural tools using choice architecture or debiasing. Alternatively, 
policy tools such as taxes and mandatory preservation can be utilised.  
 
A number of studies in the United States regarding pre-retirement cash-outs appear, on face value, to lend 
support to the idea of consumption smoothing or bounded rationality as leading to low preservation 
levels. These studies find that the propensity to withdraw funds prior to retirement is higher for younger 
employees, lower income employees and those with lower education levels (Bassett et al., 1998; 
Engelhardt, 2002; Hurd & Panis, 2006; Moore & Muller, 2002; Munnell et al., 2009; Poterba, Venti, & Wise, 
2000). However as these studies have not explicitly included a comprehensive assessment of potential 
behavioural factors, no definitive conclusions can be drawn regarding the rationality of behaviour 
observed in these studies. More significantly, current policy interventions only assist those who display 
bounded willpower. Once again no specific testing of this assumption, of lack of self-control as a driver of 
low preservation levels, has taken place. This conceptual model therefore creates the opportunity to 
develop a more comprehensive approach to testing factors which impact on preservation decisions. The 
ultimate goal would be to ensure that policy makers implement appropriate interventions.  
 
 
 
Decision 
Frame
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7. Conclusion 
 
The conceptual model developed in terms of this study highlights the distinct differences in the drivers of 
rational and irrational behaviour and the distinctly different solutions which ultimately depend on the 
level of rationality. Little is known about the rationality or otherwise of the preservation decision making 
process.  However, current solutions only assist if individuals display bounded willpower. It is therefore 
essential that a better understanding of decision making in this context is obtained.  This will ensure that 
the solutions put in place are properly aligned with the underlying factors which actually play a role in 
retirement preservation decisions. 
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